fox files

Suppose, for a moment, that a sovereign government had cultivated within its borders an organization that murders its opponents abroad, disrupts foreign societies, and exerts violent control over entire prison and migrant networks. Suppose further that this government then bartered its own political prisoners and ten American hostages to reclaim hundreds of that organization’s operatives from a foreign jail. What conclusion ought a rational observer to draw?

To say this was merely an exchange of citizens would be to miss the point. The July 2025 three-way prisoner swap between the US, El Salvador, and Venezuela was something closer to a military extraction, one that unmasked the true nature of Tren de Aragua. It made visible what had been deniable. This was not an act of consular compassion, it was a rescue mission. And its target was not innocents, but criminals. The Venezuelan government wanted them back. That tells us something we can no longer afford to ignore.

El Salvador handed over all the Venezuelan nationals accused of being part of the criminal organization Tren de Aragua (TDA). Many of them faced multiple charges of murder, robbery, rape, and other serious crimes.

Tren de Aragua is not a mere gang. It is, functionally and operationally, a paramilitary organ of the Venezuelan state. To say this is not to speculate, but to infer from patterns, evidence, and now, from action. This gang, which metastasized from the Tocorón prison in central Venezuela, exhibits all the features one expects from an irregular army: internal hierarchy, territorial ambition, transnational reach, and, crucially, political utility to the regime that birthed it.

The gang’s origin was no accident. Rather, it was the inevitable consequence of policies that abdicated state control of prisons and handed it instead to criminal bosses, or pranes. Within this architecture of official neglect, Tren de Aragua flourished. Not as a symptom, but as a feature. The Tocorón prison, once its stronghold, resembled less a penal institution than a fortified command center. Reports confirmed it had amenities suited not for punishment but for operations: nightclubs, zoos, encrypted comms, weapons caches. This was no fluke. This was logistics.

That Maduro’s government allowed this gang to take root and expand is not in dispute. But more telling is what the government did when confronted with the gang’s reach abroad. It did not repudiate the group. It did not disown it. It did not offer to assist foreign law enforcement. Instead, it demanded their return. The men captured and imprisoned in El Salvador’s CECOT mega-prison were not dentists or students. They were alleged enforcers of a criminal syndicate, many identified as having been deported under President Trump’s Alien Enemies Act directive. They were, by the logic of the swap, high-value assets.

A government does not swap hostages for liabilities. It swaps for assets. Venezuela’s choice to release political prisoners, some held for years, and ten Americans, hostages whose freedom could have earned diplomatic leverage, in exchange for gang foot soldiers only makes sense if those men were of strategic value. To Venezuela, they were.

And that should worry us.

Consider the testimony of US intelligence officials and reports from groups like the Human Rights Foundation and InSight Crime. These entities have long pointed to the integration of Tren de Aragua with state mechanisms in Venezuela. The Heritage Foundation bluntly names Tren de Aragua a “state-sponsored criminal organization.” Evidence abounds. In 2024, Chilean prosecutors tied the gang to the politically motivated murder of Venezuelan dissident Ronald Ojeda in Santiago. Their conclusion? The gang acted on orders from Caracas. A protected witness identified Diosdado Cabello, Maduro’s close ally, as the source of the order.

In the past, this kind of arrangement would be dismissed as circumstantial, even conspiratorial. But the prisoner swap strips away that defense. It clarifies intention. When a government sacrifices high-profile hostages for the return of criminals, it signals that those criminals are functionaries. Their loss was operational. Their recovery was essential. The swap was not a random gesture. It was a reabsorption of force.

And this is where the use of the Alien Enemies Act by President Trump finds its vindication. Critics decried the classification of TdA as an enemy force. They claimed it blurred the line between immigration enforcement and warfare. But warfare, as practiced by rogue regimes, is often irregular. It is practiced by proxy, under cover of migration, and masked as criminality. Tren de Aragua’s insertion into the US via migrant waves and its documented role in sex trafficking, narcotics, and targeted assassinations meets the threshold. The regime that cultivated it, extracted it. What further evidence is required?

Some will ask, perhaps in good faith, whether the swap could have been motivated by domestic optics. Perhaps Maduro simply sought a PR victory. That is implausible. The international cost of freeing political prisoners and American hostages is high. The propaganda value of 252 criminals is low. Unless they are not simply criminals.

The US intelligence community, in recent reports made available to Congress and partially quoted in the press, has warned of Maduro’s intent to destabilize target countries through the export of violence. These warnings have been echoed in Colombia, Peru, and Chile, where Tren de Aragua has been implicated in everything from extortion to political killings. These are not crimes of opportunity. They are crimes of strategy. Crimes that align with the goals of a regime that prefers entropy abroad to dissent at home.

Why then, one might ask, would Venezuela seek their return? Precisely because these operatives are valuable. They are trained. They have connections. They can be redeployed. Their imprisonment in El Salvador was a loss of capacity. Their repatriation is not a moral victory, it is a logistical correction.

Moreover, the messaging around their return confirms this. Caracas did not say: we will try them. It said: they were unjustly imprisoned. It called the CECOT facility a concentration camp. It framed the operation as a humanitarian rescue. This is the language one uses not for unwanted criminals, but for comrades.

We have reached a point where the lines must be drawn clearly. If Tren de Aragua is a mere criminal network, then the behavior of the Venezuelan state is inexplicable. If, however, it is a paramilitary proxy, then the state’s conduct is coherent. We must judge by actions, not alibis.

Which brings us to the implications for US policy. First, the use of wartime powers to designate and deport members of hostile foreign entities must not only continue but be expanded. The logic that justified the Alien Enemies Act applies not just to Venezuelan operatives but to any non-state actor deployed by a hostile regime. Second, diplomatic engagement with Venezuela must assume, absent hard disproof, that its regime operates in bad faith and that any concession made to it will be used to further asymmetrical aggression. Third, our law enforcement and intelligence agencies must treat Tren de Aragua cells in the US not as gangs but as forward-deployed irregulars. They are not a nuisance. They are an army. And placing this army inside our own civilian prison system is a catastrophic error. Tren de Aragua honed its command structure, recruitment strategy, and ideological grip inside prisons. They do not just survive in incarceration, they thrive, recruit, and expand. Every year they spend in a US facility is another year of spreading their influence behind bars. We need a new solution, one that does not empower them to grow stronger within the very institutions tasked with suppressing them.

Finally, the public must understand the stakes. We are not dealing with a regional problem. We are dealing with a regime that has discovered it can project force, sow chaos, and suppress dissent not through ideology, but through crime. It has found that terror wears the face of poverty. That insurgency can enter wearing a backpack. That violence, strategically applied, can be dismissed as coincidence.

But the coincidence has expired. The swap made that clear. It ended ambiguity. And now that it is clear, our response must be as well.